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ABSTRACT Introduction: The theory points out to the existence of likely links between party ideology and migratory policies, stating
that, in principle, values associated with the right, based on nationalism, tend to, restrict immigration dynamics more than those
linked to the axiology of the left, anchored in universalism. Does party ideology affect immigration patterns in the European Union?
This paper tests the hypothesis that the greater the values in ideology (right-wing governments), the smaller the number of migrants to
that specific country. Materials and Methods: The research design replicates secondary data from both a parliament and government
database (ParlGov) and the Comparative Manifesto Project. We also use data from the Global Bilateral Migration Database and Bilat-
eral Migration Matrix. Besides the descriptive statistics, we examine the relationship between ideology and migration flows. We esti-
mated two regression models to deal with the following dependent variables: net migration and refugee population by country or
territory of asylum. Results: Using data from ParlGov, Manifesto, and QoG, descriptive statistics has stressed a very heterogeneous
cartography of political features, ideology, and migration in European Union countries. The first regression analysis using aggregate
data suggests that the greater the values of ideology per country (right-wing oriented), the lower the number of people entering that
country. However, the findings from our disaggregated statistical analysis, particularly Model 1, indicate no effect of cabinet ideology
on net migration. As for the refugee category for immigrants, our results suggest that right-oriented national governments are less re-
ceptive to refugees. Model 2 stated that a one-point increase in ideology is associated with a 13% average reduction in the number of
refugees entering the country. Discussion: This study advances our current understanding about the relationship between party ideol-
ogy and immigration patterns. Nonetheless, the results of the regression analysis show limited evidence in favor of our hypothesis that
the more to the right of the ideological spectrum governments are, the lower the number of refugees they will accept. However, this
analysis is only meant to show a relationship between ideology and migration. Causal claims should be interpreted with caution.
KEYWORDS: European Union; government; ideology; migration; political parties.
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I. Introduction1
The permeability of borders has increased with the process of globaliza-tion (Kogut 1991; Aman 1994; Simmons & Piché 2002). Goods, capital,and individuals circulate with greater ease, demanding the transforma-
tion of the political, social, and economic standards of governance (Munck
2008). However, this transformation elicits different ideological paths. Even if
the classic polarization between the right and the left has been attenuated, both
approaching after the fall of the Berlin Wall, significant nuances still mark them
regarding their conceptions of the functions of the State (Bobbio 1994).
The literature suggests a correlation between party ideology and immigra-
tion (Fitzgerald, Leblang & Teets 2014). For example, after studying right-wing
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parties in Scandinavia, Anderson (1996, p.505) concludes that migratory pres-
sure matters in voters’ choices for these parties. Similarly, Arzheimer (2009) ar-
gues that the systems that offer minimal benefits and low unemployment and
immigration rates are those that predict the lowest levels of extreme right sup-
port. Fisher (2009, p.465) highlights that some elements such as conservatism,
liberalism, Christian democracy, nationalism, and libertarianism have been in-
cluded on the right-wing ideological and philosophical spectrum. Still,
Schweisguth (2001, p.203) indicates three possible cleavages: (i) state interven-
tionism / economic liberalism; (ii) religious traditionalism / profane liberalism;
(iii) universalistic humanism / rigorist nationalism.
The theory points to the existence of possible links between party ideology
and migratory public policies, stating that, in principle, values associated with
the right tend to, based on nationalism, restrict immigration dynamics more than
those linked to the axiology of the left, anchored in universalism.
Does party ideology affect immigration patterns in the European Union?
This paper tests the hypothesis that the greater the values in ideology (right-
wing governments), the smaller the number of migrants to that specific country.
The research design replicates data from a parliament and government database
(ParlGov) and the Comparative Manifesto Project. We also use secondary data
from the Global Bilateral Migration Database and Bilateral Migration Matrix.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on immigration and party ideology in Europe. We are particularly in-
terested in the theoretical framework linking ideology and migration flow. Sec-
tion 3 describes the main features of our research design - data and methods - in
order to increase transparency and reproducibility (King 1995; Janz 2016). Sec-
tion 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for three secondary datasets and pro-
poses a regression analysis. Section five concludes this work with some final
remarks.
II. Immigration and Party Ideology in Europe
According to official data2, from mid-2014 to 2015 about 1.7 million immi-
grants have arrived in Europe. Most of the immigrants crossed the border from
Africa and Middle East through Mediterranean Sea motived by civil wars in
their countries of origin, and this is especially true for the Syrian Civil war. This
involuntary migration flow has brought the continent new challenges in terms
of governance and public policy.
Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini has char-
acterized the problem as the greatest structural phenomenon of modern times,
stressing the need for European institutions to act with precision to raise efforts
to address the problem which, according to her, should not be perceived by the
continent as a temporary emergency. The creation in 2016 of the European Bor-
der and Coast Guard Agency, named as Frontex, is the most recent action taken
by the European Council to improve border control and the cooperation with
national governments close to Mediterranean Sea3.
Since the creation of Frontext, the number of irregular immigrants crossing
in EU has decreased in 80%. The high number of deaths in the border crossing
attempts as well as the strengthening of border control and of the deportation
policies are considered possible causes for the recent numbers. In addition, the
recent overall raise of the right-wing coalitions in several European countries
also might reflects an increase in the intolerance levels to the presence of immi-
grants4. Italian government is the main example of a right-wing coalition which
established stricter rules for rescue and acceptance of irregular immigrants in
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the Mediterranean Sea5. Such a context has encouraged academics and manag-
ers to raise assumptions about possible political relations around the issue.
According to Franchino (2009), several approaches have tried to explain the
migration flows, whether through systemic factors, such as economic stability
and post-war transhumance or domestic variables, national policies, and cul-
tural conflicts, for example. However, when a complex decision-making ar-
rangement such as the European Union is added to the analysis, it is not possible
to discard completely any of those variables. In fact, the European Union is sub-
mitted to a supplementary level of power - Brussels - which makes all deci-
sion-making processes much more intricate.
The level of tolerance of national citizens towards immigrants is also por-
trayed in the literature as an important variable explaining public opinion in pol-
icy formulation. Garand, Xu & Davis (2017) assert that previous studies have
identified that an increase in migration flows decreases support for a stronger
welfare state, which could mean the rejection of leftist parties in elections, since
they are often associated with robust states. This occurs because of the increase
in racial and ethnic heterogeneity of the community, which also might be corre-
lated to a lower sense of national identity and solidarity (Garand, Xu & Davis
2017, p.7). Following Garand, Joppke (2003) suggests that citizenship legisla-
tion matters for the migration issue. He, however, associates the making of such
legislation with the political choice of the State and not with its national or cul-
tural specificities. That is, for Joppke:
“center-left governments will make citizenship more inclusive, center-right gov-
ernments will make it more restrictive for immigrants, and right-wing govern-
ments will be more concerned with the citizenship of expatriates” (Sredanovic
2016, p. 440).
The authors identify race as a crucial variable in the United States - unlike
Europe - since U.S. citizens perceive immigrants and their descendants, espe-
cially those of African origin, as the main beneficiaries of a stronger welfare
state. In sum, stereotypes of immigrants, misperception of their professional
skills and of their economic situation, and racism are important criteria for un-
derstanding American’s conception of how the State and its institutions should
function6.
As said above, this discussion is even more complex when we turn to a re-
gional context. Markaki & Longhi (2012) investigate how local characteristics
impact attitudes towards immigration. For example, why does the level of toler-
ance toward immigrants vary so much between countries under the European
Union governance system regardless of migration flows? The authors propose a
new cross-country methodology combining individual and aggregate data sets
to explain the anti-immigrant attitudes7. Instead of using countries as main
cases, Markaki & Longui (2012) use two different data sets that sort the cases by
regional characteristics, not only by individual and domestic, but also by
anti-immigrant perception.
Despite the confirmation that older and less educated individuals hold stron-
ger anti-immigration attitudes, especially when it concerns immigrants outside
the EU, the authors found that:“people living in big cities are less likely to view
immigration as harmful, whereas respondents living in rural areas are more
prone to express feelings of threat” (Markaki & Longui 2012, p.15).
But this context is only true if the immigrants are working and if there are
opportunities to promote inter-group contact, decreasing cultural conflicts.
The results of Markaki & Longui (2012) also suggest that it is not only eco-
nomic growth and unemployment rates that influence the identification of im-
migrants as a threat, but also a native’s misperception of the overall situation of
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the immigrant (their professional skills, their origins, and even their migration
flow). Finally, regarding the recent increase in international migration flows,
the authors suggest future research should analyze the local conditions for na-
tives to support immigration separately to EU and non-EU immigrants. Accord-
ing to Markaki and Longui (2012), attitudes toward immigration seem to
diverge depending on the origin of the migrant.
The literature has also tried to identify how national policies of immigration
control might be influenced by migration flows. Based on the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) dataset, Franchino (2009)
identified, using a factor analysis, two main immigration trends among Euro-
pean countries since the 1960s. The first trend, which includes Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland,
presents a discontinuous rate of immigration, with peaks and troughs in the pe-
riod; the second trend, which includes Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
and Norway, has experienced reversed flows; whereas they had high-emigra-
tion flows, especially before the European expansion, recently they have be-
come a destination for immigrants. One possible reason for those different
trends in immigration rates, especially for the first group, is the implementation
of more restricted immigration policies (Franchino 2009, p.405)8.
Therefore, the author discusses if and how those policies can be effective in
controlling the migration flows. Despite the literature’s assertion that mecha-
nisms to restrict the migration flows can only be imperfect Messina (2007, apud
Franchino 2009) affirms that research focusing on domestic institutions such as
(i) the legislative and executive branches, (ii) agenda-setting and veto powers,
and (iii) the whole decision-making process could better explain how and when
immigration policy control might vary over time, between countries, and even
within government coalitions. For instance, some ministers and legislators
might set up immigration restriction laws based on a particular country of origin
and professional skills, while trying to attract skilled migrants from other coun-
tries (Franchino 2009, p.410).
Regarding previous studies, it is possible to assert that the characteristics of
both the natives and the immigrants matter for how citizens reacts to the in-
crease in immigration flux. As Markaki & Longui (2012) affirm, the country of
origin and status of the immigrant are important variables for identifying the ef-
fects of immigration in both national and international arenas. When the immi-
grant has a refugee status, specific asylum policies need to be discussed and
applied to address the problem. According to the authors, this aspect also might
impact on citizens’ electoral behavior. Dummet (2001) affirms that illegal im-
migrants have similar characteristics: they are poor, and they are usually fleeing
serious problems in their countries of origin, i.e. economic crisis and violence
derived from civil wars. For most of them, the costs of waiting for the asylum
process to be successfully concluded are too high.
Indeed, refugee status, forged by the 1951 Geneva Convention (as amended
by the 1967 Protocol) is very restrictive and reflects concerns rooted in the Cold
War. As Peter Burnell stresses:
“the majority of involuntary migrations have arisen in the Third World, follow-
ing war, civil war, or general civil disorder, often producing an indiscriminate
deprivation of basic human rights and economic destruction” (Bunell 2009,
p.454)
Petiteville (2012, p.350) stresses that three-quarters of asylum seekers are
not granted refugee status. As a matter of fact, they are denied the right to asy-
lum and become de facto persons in an irregular situation in the country where
they have applied for refugee status.
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Accordingly, this paper considers the refugee status as a different category
within the migration flow9. This category, internationally recognized and there-
fore legitimized, emerges consensually as a broad and common frame of refer-
ence that targets the actions of states and qualifies the attributes that define the
legal migrant10. Despite the effort to define precisely the profile of the refugee,
there is no guarantee that the exercise of interpretation by different governments
will not be subject to the use of normative principles. This could lead to differ-
ent migratory public policies relating to the refugee, which would vary within
the right-left ideological spectrum. On the other hand, outside the refugee insti-
tution, there does not seem to be an international regime with legitimacy and le-
gality and, as a result, States feel “compliance free” to adopt policies that are -
even if particularly so - convenient11. Coping with the illegality and / or illegiti-
macy of a migrant who is not a refugee can reduce the ideological gap between
governments, making left-wing or right-wing public policies not significantly
different. That is, migration policy would assume a supra-ideological national-
istic bias, ultimately based on citizen preference, which is, indeed, legally legiti-
mized and legalized within the nation-state.
The legal scope of the European Union provides for several mechanisms
through which community policy is established. Like the division of compe-
tences in multilevel governance, the legislative acts adopted differ from the de-
gree of imposition of the European standard. As far as the Constitutional
Treaties are concerned, only recently has the issue of migration gained promi-
nence. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) was the first legal framework to address
the issue within the European Union through the organization of institutional
pillars, among which migration policy was inserted and the Schengen Agree-
ment incorporated into the bloc12. However, until the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1999), the problem of immigration in general, not to mention refugee asylum,
had little influence from supranational institutions, allowing significant auton-
omy from the Member States. Since the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), asylum and
immigration policies have been approached like any other public policy, with
the supranational institutions competing for the standardization of community
policy surrounding immigration and refugee asylum13. The influence of new
immigration and asylum policies on national political dynamics is clear.
In The Party Politics of the EU and Immigration, Odmalm (2014) argues that
political parties may find an incompatibility between their ideological positions
and specific issues. Accordingly, political parties struggle to deal with “conflict-
ing ideological pulls” (Odmalm 2011, apud Odmalm 2014), where internal ideo-
logical tensions provoke them to rethink - and perhaps change slightly - their
political positions in order to maintain electoral survival. Those conflicts occur
internally between leadership and externally, when the political parties compete
to assert which proposition is best fit to solve a specific problem.
In order to verify if ideology matters or not, Odmalm (2014) compares the
political parties manifesto positions with qualitative interviews made with
members of the national parliaments and political strategists. His analysis fo-
cuses on two very relevant issues: the role of the European Union and immigra-
tion policy control. The author considers that these issues may express better the
cleavages in multilevel-governance and divergences between party ideology
and political pragmatism. Thus, Odmalm (2014) compares the Belgian, British,
Dutch, and Swedish party systems between 1991 and 2010, considering the dif-
ferent dynamics inside those countries and how external critical conjectures dis-
tinctly affected them, whether with different immigration flow patterns or the
relation with EU institutions.
Arriving at some overall conclusions, the author points out that ideology is
still an important factor for political party competition. However, ideology may
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vary across countries and among political parties. Despite some criticism, the
Manifesto is still the best dataset for identifying the ideological foundation of
political parties. However, complementary methods, as indicated by Odmalm
(2014), might be helpful in asserting the complexity of this theme, especially
when dealing with a multilevel governance context.
Finally, the correlation between immigration flows and party ideology still
represents a gap in the literature. Systematic research conducted with the jour-
nals International Affairs, Journal of European Public Policy, and Journal of
Common Market Studies14 has identified only twenty papers dedicated to ana-
lyzing this issue in the European context. Four of these papers15 can be charac-
terized as theoretical discussions and sixteen as empirical ones16. Most of them
are also dedicated to the formulation, decision-making process, implementa-
tion, and efficiency of immigration policies.
Few papers investigate such problems using case studies of specific coun-
tries such as Italy (Geddes 2008), the United Kingdom and Ireland (Smith
2008), France (Martheler 2008), and Sweden (Hinfforns et al., 2012). However,
there are still a large number of studies that analyze the attitudes of citizens and
deputies toward migrants and a more liberal immigration control policy (Hinf-
forns et al., 2012; Lavah 1997, 2005; Smith 2008; Gerhards & Hans 2011;
Kessler & Freeman 2005; Stockemer 2016).
However, only Lavah (1997) presents a clear hypothesis that proposes test-
ing whether immigration rates are affected by party ideology. The author con-
cludes that there is an ideological continuum range from left to right that lists the
members of European parliament’s preferences on immigration policy. In addi-
tion, the deepening of European Integration does not exclude the capacity of the
political party system to retain and consolidate party affiliation and ideology
competition. Therefore, the main research objective here is to contribute to this
theoretical gap in the debate on the possible correlation between party ideology
and migration flows. This paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of how
ideology varies over time between countries, and how this affects their migra-
tion flows. Our main hypothesis is that the more to the right the ideology of the
cabinet, the lower the migration flow. We expect that the preferences of the
decisionmakers will affect actions implemented towards migration (explicit
policies or institutionalized practices) and these actions conducted by the cabi-
net will affect in its turn the migration flow.
At this point, it is useful to distinguish ideological positioning, our main ex-
planatory factor, from expressed policies. Ideological positioning refers to the
expressed preferences of political actors concerning relevant topics such as the
intervention of the State in the economy or individual rights (Laver & Budge
1992). These preferences might be real, but they are usually interpreted as stra-
tegic since it is a signaling mechanism from political actors to voters. Manifes-
tos are, by definition texts serving to present a party’s positions to the voters
(Laver & Garry 2000; Dinas & Gemenis 2010). Public policies are interven-
tions designed towards a specific topic (Baumgartner & Jones 1993).
Important to emphasize that these policies may be actual programs or insti-
tutionalized practices implemented by the State. We expect that the ideological
positioning of political actors will influence policies (these may or may not be
directly observable), and these policies will affect the migration flow. In this pa-
per, we focus on the input (ideology) and the output (migration flow) of this re-
lationship. The focus on ideological positioning is relevant because it reflects a
common field of understanding between representatives and voters. Voters are
supposed to choose those politicians that are closest to their own position. Once
in office, representatives are expected to implement decisions that reflect their
public positioning in the left-right scale. Whether this connection between the
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expressed position of the representatives and the actual migration is empirically
observed is precisely our research question.
III. Data and Methods
This section describes the data and methods17 employed to answer our re-
search question: does political party ideology affect immigration patterns in the
European Union? Table 1 summarizes the main features of our research design.
The population is composed of 28 countries whose membership was for-
mally enacted by the European Union18. The original period covers 1988 to
2015. We start by describing the main variables from two databases (ParlGov
and Manifesto)19.
Besides the descriptive statistics, we examine the relationship between ide-
ology and migration flows. We estimated two regression models to deal with
the following dependent variables: net migration and refugee population by
country or territory of asylum. For this specific reason, in the panel we employ
ParlGov and QoG data only. Table 2 describes the variables’ main features
(original names as stated in the database and operationalization).
IV. Results
This section presents some descriptive statistics of the variables used in this
study and an empirical examination of the relationship between cabinet ideol-
ogy and migration using two different specifications of the dependent variable
in the regression analysis.
IV.1 Descriptive Statistics
This section presents the data from the ParlGov and Manifesto projects that
are used to measure ideology and immigration. As far as the ideological patterns
are concerned, the numbers examined in the ParlGov dataset show that the
higher the ideological value of a party, the more the party leans to the right
wing. The left-right variable (data from ParlGov) presents information about
the ideological trends of parties on a scale from 0 to 10. The mean is 5.19 with a
standard deviation of 2.22. The Young Lithuania, from Lithuania, was the party
that stood closest to the most far right position (9.80), while The Left, from Lux-
embourg, was the one that was the closest to the most far left position of the
scale (.53). It is important to highlight that there is no information for almost
25% of the observations. The ideological patterns - throughout the aforemen-
tioned variable - might be observed in the list of countries studied here. Figure 1
shows the variation in the ideology of the national governments in the EU.
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Table 1 - Research design
Info Description
Population European Union (28 member-states)
Time frame 1988 to 2015
Techniques Descriptive and multivariate statistics
Sources ParlGov Database
Manifesto Database
QoG
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
17 Replication materials and
Appendix are available at:
https://osf.io/j4gnt/
18 The list of EU members
may be found here:
<https://europa.eu/european-u
nion/about-eu/countries_en>,
accessed on February 20th,
2020.
19 In particular, ParlGov is “a
data infrastructure for political
science and contains
information for all EU and
most OECD democracies. The
database combines
approximately 1500
parties,910 elections(8300
results), and1400
cabinets(3500 parties)”
(PARLGOV 2017). The
Manifesto Project “provides
the scientific community with
parties’ policy positions
derived from a content
analysis of parties’ electoral
manifestos. It covers over
1000 parties from 1945 until
today in over 50 countries on
five continents”
(MANIFESTO
COODEBOOK 2016). Here
we use the Manifesto database
Version 2016a.
Estonia (5.92), Slovakia (5.84) and Hungary (5.79) have the highest means,
which indicates that these countries have governments associated with the far
right. On the other hand, Portugal (4,19), Greece (4,45) and Germany (4,54)
have the more leftish average ideological composition.
We employ data from the Manifesto project to explore the variation of the
favorable mentions of the manifesto country’s nation, history, and general ap-
peals. Figure 2 illustrates how the variable national way of life + is represented
in each country.
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Table 2 - Variables
Source Variable (label) Description
ParlGovI country_name Name of country in English
caretaker Caretaker cabinet with a limited legislative mandate: non-partisan, provi-
sional, technical or continuation (tree month rule) cabinet
cabinet_party Indicates if the cabinet is composed by members of opposition parties
prime_minister Indicates if the party fills the prime minister position
election_seats_total Total number of seats per country
Seats Number of seats per party/election
election_date Date the election took place.
left_right 0—10 scale mean value in left/right dimension with data from Castles/Mair
1983, Huber/Inglehart 1995, Benoit/Laver 2006 and CHES 2010.
ManifestoII countryname Name of country in English
per601 Favorable mentions of the manifesto country’s nation, history, and general
appeals.
per602 Unfavorable mentions of the manifesto country’s nation and history.
Rile Right-left position of party as given in Michael Laver/Ian
per601_2 Statement advocating the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e. ac-
cepting new immigrants.
per602_2 Statements favoring new immigrants; against restrictions and quotas; rejec-
tion of the ‘boat is full’ argument.
QOGIII wdi_mignet Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total
number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both
citizens and noncitizens. Data are five-year estimates.
wdi_refasylum Refugees are people who are recognized as refugees under the 1951 Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, the 1969
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems in Africa, people recognized as refugees in accor-
dance with the UNHCR statute, people granted refugee-like humanitarian
status, and people provided temporary protection. Asylum seekers people
who have applied for asylum or refugee status and who have not yet re-
ceived a decision or who are registered as asylum seekers are excluded. Pal-
estinian refugees are people (and their descendants) whose residence was
Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948 and who lost their homes and
means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Country of
asylum is the country where an asylum claim was led and granted.
Merge between
ParlGov and QOG
data
Mean_Ideology_Cabi-
net_Pond_Parties
New variable as the result of a weighted average of the party ideology in re-
lation to the proportion of the party number of seats per country/year.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
IParlGov database: <http://www.parlgov.org/data/table/view_cabinet/>, accessed on March 10th, 2017
IIManifesto database: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, accessed on March 10th, 2017.
IIIQoG database: <http://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/dataarchive/qog_std_jan15.pdf>, accessed on June 26th, 2017.
Latvia presents the highest mean (6.039) while Spain presents the lowest
one (.166). The higher the mean value, the more a country is composed of par-
ties whose manifestos make mention of nationalist views. The opposite may be
observed in the Figure 3 where the variable national way of life - illustrates
party manifestos that do not convey nationalist views.
The United Kingdom presents the highest mean (.96) while Sweden,
Slovenia, Portugal, Poland, and Malta present the lowest (0.00). This indicates
that the UK presents the lowest number of nationalist mentions in their party
manifestos.
The right-left ideological index indicates the party position in a classifica-
tion between right and left (Laver & Budge 1992). This variable embraces
1,404 cases (with a mean of -1.35 and a standard deviation of 19.02). Its ampli-
tude varies from -53.44 (minimum value) to 90.91 (maximum value). The lower
the value, the more a party leans to the left. Figure 4 shows the mean per country
from 1988 to 2015.
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Source: Elaborated by the authors. Data from ParlGov.
Figure 1 - Ideology per country
Source: Elaborated by the authors. Data from Manifesto.
Figure 2 - National way of life + (mean)
Bulgaria presents the highest mean (7.43) while the German Democratic
Republic presents the lowest one (-18.58). This means that Bulgaria leads the
ranking of the right while the German Democratic Republic leads the left.
Aggregate level data (Figure 5) suggest that the greater the values of ideol-
ogy for each country (right-wing oriented), the lower the number of people en-
tering that country (r = -.439; n = 27; P value = .022).
The correlation presented in Figure 5 means that the value of the Net Migra-
tion variable (the difference between the number of people entering and leaving
the country) seems to be higher in leftist countries since the number of persons
entering those countries overlap the number of people leaving them20.
By examining the aggregated relationship between ideology and the loga-
rithm of number of refugees (Figure 6), we observe a weak negative correlation
that is not statically significant (r = -.196; n = 27; p-value = .328)21.
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Source: Elaborated by the authors. Data from Manifesto.
Figure 3 - National way of life - (mean)
Source: Elaborated by the authors. Data from Manifesto.
Figure 4 - Manifesto right-left ideological index: mean
20 We observe interesting
results by subsampling our
data. For example, by
excluding Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal, the correlation
In short, our main aggregated results suggest the following: (1) the higher
the the value on the ideology scale (right-wing oriented), the lower the average
net migration; (2) these results are subject to change depending on specific case
selection; and (3) there is no association between ideology and the refugee pop-
ulation.
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Source: Elaborated by the authors. Data from QOG and ParlGov.
n = 27, r = -.439, p-value = .022.
Figure 5 - Ideology x net migration
Source: Elaborate by the authors. Data from QOG and ParlGov.
n = 27, r = -.196, p-value = .328
Figure 6 - Ideology x refugee by territory or country of asylum
coefficient goes to -.620
(p-value < .001). In other
words, the association
between ideology and net
migration becomes stronger.
Conversely, by excluding
Germany, Italy, and Spain, the
negative correlation disappears
and the relationship between
ideology and migration is no
longer statistically significant
(p-value = .417).
21 For Germany (DEU) the
number of refugees
standardized value is
extremely high (z = 4.78) and
could influence coefficients’
consistency. For this reason,
we preferred to use
logarithmic transformation.
IV.2 Regression analysis
In this section, we examine the relationship between cabinet ideology and
migration using two different specifications of the dependent variable. First, we
present the results considering net migration by country and year; in the second
specification, we consider refugees by country of asylum and year. The refugee
variable was log transformed before inclusion in the models. Migration is a
complex issue and is caused by many different factors. To take this into consid-
eration, we include country dummy variables to hold fixed specific characteris-
tics of the countries in the analysis such as culture, legal tradition, or socioeco-
nomic status. Table 3 summarizes the results.
Model 1 presents the results of the effect of cabinet ideology over net migra-
tion. Our theoretical expectation was that the greater the values of cabinet ideol-
ogy, meaning that the government was leaning more towards the right, the
greater the reduction in the net migration of that country. However, the results
indicate that there is no evidence to support rejecting the null hypothesis, mean-
ing that the impact of cabinet ideology on net migration in the population cannot
be differentiated from zero.
Model 2 shows the effect of the same ideology variable now on the num-
ber of refugees accepted in the country. The issue of refugee asylum is di-
rectly in the political spotlight considering both the humanitarian implica-
tions and also the preferences of citizens. The past elections in European
Union countries were dominated by this debate of whether or not to accept
refugees. Our results show that there is a statistically significant effect of
cabinet ideology on the number of refugees. This result means that the
greater the right-wing inclination of the cabinet, the smaller the number of
refugees entering that country. Since this variable is included in the models
in its log transformation, the results should be read in percentages. In light of
this, we understand that 1-point increase in the ideology to be associated
with a 13% average reduction in the number of refugees entering the coun-
try. Figure 7 shows the predicted values of the refugee variable, considering
the different levels of cabinet ideology.
The more to the right of the ideological spectrum a government is, the
smaller the number of refugees entering that country. However, as indicated by
the confidence intervals, this effect is very heterogeneous in the smaller values
of the ideology variable, becoming more precise in the larger values of ideol-
ogy. This means that there is greater variation among the left-wing governments
and more homogeneity among right-wing governments. For this reason, the
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Table 3 - Ideology and immigration in the European Union
Model 1 Model 2
VD Net migration Log Refugee by Asylum
Constant -123,992.5 (257,497) 9.199377 (.3821349)
Ideology 66,235.75 (51,334.94) -.1376671* (.0750195)
Country dummy Yes Yes
R2 (within) .0156 .0065
F 5.01 156.60
N 133 545
Source: Elaborated by the authors. Data from QOG and ParlGov.
Note: Coefficients reported. Standard-errors in parenthesis.
* P-value < .10; ** P-value < .05; *** P-value < .01.
mean effect of ideology on refugees by asylum is only marginally significant
(p-value = .067).
In sum, our results suggest the following. Different from what we expected,
there is no negative relationship between ideology and immigration flows.
However, when we consider a different specification of the dependent variable
(immigration patterns), we observe a negative and statistically significant asso-
ciation between ideology and the number of refugees entering in a particular
country. In fact, we find that right-wing governments are less receptive to immi-
grants.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied a literature and presented a statistical analysis that
points to the existence of possible links between party ideology and migratory
public policies, stating that, in principle, values associated with the right tend to,
based on nationalism, restrict immigration dynamics more than those associated
with the left of the ideological spectrum, which is anchored in universalism.
Using data from ParlGov, Manifesto, and QoG, descriptive statistics has
stressed a very heterogeneous cartography of political features, ideology, and
migration in European Union countries. The first regression analysis using ag-
gregate data suggests that the greater the values of ideology per country
(right-wing oriented), the lower the number of people entering that country.
However, the findings from our disaggregated statistical analysis, particularly
Model 1, indicate no effect of cabinet ideology on net migration.
As far as the refugees’ category for immigrants is concerned, our results
suggest that right-oriented national governments are less receptive to refugees.
Model 2 stated that a one-point increase in ideology is associated with a 13% av-
erage reduction in the number of refugees entering the country. This supports
claims in the literature such as those made by Markaki & Longui (2012) that
attitudes toward immigration seem to diverge depending on the origin of the mi-
grant. The authors highlight that the country of origin and status of the immi-
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Source: Elaborated by the authors. Data from QOG and ParlGov.
Figure 7 - Cabinet ideology and refugees in the European Union
grant are important variables to identify the effects of immigration in both
national and international arenas.
This study advances our current understanding about the relationship be-
tween party ideology and immigration patterns. Nonetheless, the results of the
regression analysis show limited evidence in favor of our hypothesis that the
more to the right of the ideological spectrum governments are, the lower the
number of refugees they will accept. However, this analysis is only meant to
show a relationship between ideology and migration. Causal claims should be
interpreted with caution.
The correlation between immigration flows and party ideology still repre-
sents a gap in the literature. That said, in terms of a future research agenda,
semi-structured interviews with representatives of the governments of the coun-
tries that make up the European Union could be carried out with the aim of
deepening existing research designs and innovating research methodologies
relevant to the study of the possible relation between ideology and migration.
Such a future research agenda will seek to fill gaps existing in the contempo-
rary literature and will follow premises defended by authors such as Franchino
(2009), who affirms that research with focus on domestic institutions as: (i) the
legislative and executive brands; (ii) agenda-setting and veto powers; (iii) and
the whole decision-making process could explain better how and when immi-
gration policy varies over time, between countries, and even within government
coalitions.
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Padrões de Ideologia e Imigração na União Europeia (1988–2015)
RESUMO Introdução: A teoria aponta para a existência de possíveis elos entre a ideologia partidária e as políticas públicas
migratórias, afirmando que, em princípio, valores associados à direita tendem a, com base no nacionalismo, restringir mais as
dinâmicas de imigração do que aquelas ligadas à axiologia da esquerda, ancorada no universalismo. A ideologia partidária afeta os
padrões de imigração na União Europeia? Este artigo testa a hipótese de que quanto maiores os valores na ideologia (governos de
direita), menor o número de migrantes para aquele país específico. Materiais e Métodos: O desenho da pesquisa replica dados
secundários do ParlGov e do Comparative Manifesto Project. Também usamos dados do Global Bilateral Migration Database e do Bi-
lateral Migration Matrix. Além da estatística descritiva, examinamos a relação entre ideologia e fluxos migratórios. Nós estimamos
dois modelos de regressão para lidar com as seguintes variáveis dependentes: migração líquida e população de refugiados por país ou
território de asilo. Resultados: Usando dados do ParlGov, Manifesto e QoG, a estatística descritiva enfatizou uma cartografia muito
heterogênea de características políticas, ideologia e migração nos países da União Europeia. A primeira análise de regressão usando
dados agregados sugere que quanto maiores os valores de ideologia por país (orientada para a direita), menor o número de pessoas
que entram naquele país. No entanto, os resultados de nossa análise estatística desagregada, particularmente o Modelo 1, não
indicam nenhum efeito da ideologia de gabinete sobre a migração líquida. No que diz respeito à categoria de refugiados para
imigrantes, nossos resultados sugerem que os governos nacionais orientados para a direita são menos receptivos aos refugiados. O
Modelo 2 afirmou que um aumento de um ponto na ideologia está associado a uma redução média de 13% no número de refugiados
que entram no país. Discussão: Nosso estudo avança o entendimento atual sobre a relação entre ideologia partidária e padrões de
imigração. No entanto, os resultados da análise de regressão mostram evidências limitadas em favor da nossa hipótese de que quanto
mais à direita o governo no espectro ideológico, menor o número de refugiados aceitos no país. No entanto, esta análise destina-se
apenas a mostrar uma relação entre ideologia e migração. Reivindicações causais devem ser interpretadas com cautela.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: União Europeia; governo; ideologia; migração; partidos políticos.
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